From last week, continues the narrative of what transpired after the death of Gen Abacha and how the PRC handled the process of who would succeed him as Commander-in-Chief. With General Diya in detention, Gen Haladu indisposed, Gen Useni considered unpopular and Gen Bamaiyi reluctant to step in, the lot eventually fell on Gen Abdusalami Abubakar.
When I recently saw Major General (rtd.) Muftau Balogun who was at that time a member of the Provisional Ruling Council at Ikoyi Club, he said he has put June 8, 1998 behind him and has allowed bygones to be bygones. “Eric, don’t forget this happened 27 years ago,” he said.
He has moved on; for in 2017, he was elected Chairman of Ikoyi Club.
The PRC meeting that was to decide on the fate of General Diya instead selected General Abdusalami Abubakar as the Head of State after burying General Abacha in Kano. Till today the Malu report was never approved or rejected. It was never considered.
If we are to believe the report of what happened that day, the then Chief of Army Staff, Lt-General Ishaya Bamaiya (75) wrote in his book titled, The Vindication of a General: “General Abacha died in the early hours of 8 June 1998. His family decided he would not be given a military burial and had to be buried at night in Kano. Before leaving Abuja for Kano with the remains of General Abacha, I observed that some officers were not ready to go to Kano for the burial.
“At the Airport, I had to order Marwa to go into the aircraft to proceed to Kano. At that time, I had already given orders to Lt Colonel Mana Co81Bn Keffi to ensure no officer took any step against the government; he was not to take orders from anyone but me. He was ordered to deal with anyone who made any move to take over the government while we were in Kano.
“We returned from Kano and went into the Chambers to decide who would become the Commander-in-Chief. While in Kano, some senior officers had decided the Chief of Army Staff would take over the government. I had never been interested in any political office, had avoided so far, and had no intention of taking up the position of Commander-in-Chief. I made this clear to the to the senior officers who insisted I should take over, including Generals Victor Samuel Leonard Malu, Bashir Salihi Magashi and Patrick Aziza. I was also aware of some junior officers who were against my taking over as Commander-in-Chief because they knew I would not tolerate them in service.
“The problem I had convincing the senior officers to allow General A.A. Abubakar to take over. The issue of succession now fell to me, and some of the commanding officers and the staff told me I had to take charge to save the situation. I told them I believed in Abubakar, and we should support him.
“While this was going on, some junior officers were campaigning against Useni and me. They believed that once I took over, they would be in trouble, but I never had any intention of taking any political post. I had joined the army not for politics.
“When I told the senior officers I would not take over as Commander-in-Chief, the officers close to me said I was going to regret this action. I did not believe them because General Abubakar and I had been very close since we had been Lieutenant and played hockey for 2 Mechanised Division with Generals Shehu Yar’Adua and Jeremiah Useni.
“As soon as we got into the chambers, Abubakar started distributing papers as if there were going to be election. Meanwhile, people were there with Bibles and Qurans because they did not know who the Commander-in-Chief was going to be.
“It took a lot of persuasion to get the officers to accept General Abubakar. This was why during the swearing in of the Commander-in-Chief, the Quran and the Bible were brought into the chamber’s unknown to many officers and the PRC members. After the discussion, no decision was reached because papers were passed around for officers to nominate a Commander-in-Chief. I knew that problem could arise from there. When it was my turn, I got up and announced we had all agreed that General Abubakar was to be the Commander-in-Chief and had been promoted to a four-star general. Abubakar was sitting next to me. That was how we succeeded in making General Abubakar the Commander-in-Chief.
“I am glad that in the minutes of the PRC emergency meeting of 8 June, 1998 at the Council Chambers, Asokoro, Abuja, Mr. T. Fagbemi, who took the minutes, stated: ‘a member supported succession by hierarchy, then he announced the Chief of Defence Staff, Major General A.A. Abubakar as the HOS, C-in-C. The member suggested further that he should be promoted to the rank of a four-star General. This member was General IR Bamaiyi (COAS).’ Questions were asked about why Lt. General J.T. Useni, the most senior officer when General Abacha died, was not made Commander-in-Chief. Many put the blame on some of us at that time. It was difficult to sell Useni for a number of reasons.
“First and foremost, General Useni was the last officer to be with the late General Abacha when he died, and there were many insinuations of his involvement in Abacha’s death. These were mere insinuations; I believe General Useni had no hand in General Abacha’s death. I became more convinced when, at the Oputa Panel, a document recovered from a security officer’s house in the officer’s handwriting stated clearly: ‘We killed Abacha.’ …. To be concluded
Credit: Eric Teniola